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vs,
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SHIRLEY ANN GOODRICH, TRUSTEE;
REECE GOODRICH,
SHIRLEY ANN GOODRICH;
BOYD J. BROWN;
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Defendants/Appellees.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
a.

Whether the District Court erred in granting

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that the
continuing presence of Defendants' water pipes, water meter,
vault, and manhole cover upon Plaintiff's land does not
constitute a trespass when Defendants have failed to remove those
utilities from Plaintiff's land after Plaintiff's written request
to do so?
Standard of review:

A grant of summary judgment should

be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

The appellate court grants the trial court's

legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Arnold Indus., Inc. v.

Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
Preservation Below:

This issue was preserved below at

R. 151-153, 211 (pp. 13-14).
b.

Whether the District Court erred granting Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that, even if
Defendants' failure to remove their utilities from Plaintiff's
land is a trespass, it is barred by the applicable three-year
statute of limitations when: (i) Plaintiff filed the instant
lawsuit less than one year after purchasing its property; and
(ii) Defendants' had the consent of Plaintiff's predecessors in
interest to use and maintain the utilities in their present
location until the year 2000, less than three years prior to the
commencement of this lawsuit?
Standard of review:

A grant of summary judgment should

be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

The appellate court grants the trial court's

legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
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In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Arnold Indus., Inc. v.

Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
Preservation Below:

This issue was preserved below at

R. 153-157, 211 (pp. 26-27, 33-34) .
c.

Whether the District Court erred in granting

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment without addressing
Plaintiff's argument that Defendants' ongoing use of the
utilities (as opposed to the mere presence of the utilities on
Plaintiff's land) constitutes an actionable continuing trespass
because it causes water to continually flow through pipes located
on Plaintiff's property?
Standard of review:

A grant of summary judgment should

be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

The appellate court grants the trial court's

legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Arnold Indus., Inc. v.

Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
Preservation Below:

This issue was preserved below at
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R. 152-53, 157, 211 (p. 12).
d.

Whether the District Court erred in granting

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that
Defendants' have an easement by implication when: (i) one
essential element of such an easement requires that the two
parcels of land at issue were, at one time, owned by the same
person or entity; and (ii) the undisputed facts before the
District Court showed that the two adjacent parcels of land at
issue in this case did not, at any relevant time, enjoy such
unity of title?
Standard of review:

A grant of summary judgment should

be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

The appellate court grants the trial court's

legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Arnold Indus., Inc. v.

Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
Preservation Below:

This issue was preserved below at

R. 158-160, 211 (pp. 34-36).
e.

Whether the District Court erred in granting

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that
Defendants' have an easement by implication when: (i) one
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essential element of such an easement requires that the easement
is reasonably necessary to the dominant estate; (ii) Defendants'
acknowledged to the District Court that there may be alternative
ways to provide culinary water to their property; and (iii)
Defendants failed to offer any relevant evidence in support of
their assertion that removal of the utilities would be
prohibitively expensive?
Standard of review:

A grant of summary judgment

should be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

The appellate court grants the trial court's

legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Arnold Indus., Inc. v.

Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
Preservation Below:

This issue was preserved below at

R. 160, 211 (pp. 24-25, 36).
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STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provision is of central importance to this
appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1)
An action may be brought within three years:
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real
property; except that when waste or trespass is
committed by means of underground works upon any mining
claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting such waste or trespass;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellant Foxtail Properties, LLC appeals the
District Court's grant of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants in

October of 2002, seeking an injuction ordering Defendants to
remove their water pipes, water meter, and vault from Plaintiff's
property.

R. 1-3.

Defendants moved for Summary Judgment,

arguing that: (i) Plaintiff have not stated a cognizable claim
for trespass; (ii) Plaintiff's claim is time-barred; and (iii)
Defendants' have an easement by implication, a complete defense
to Plaintiff's claim for trespass.

R. 138-140.

After briefing

and oral argument, the District Court, Judge Sheila K. McCleve,
granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed
Plaintiff's Complaint.

R. 195-203.

This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early 1970's, Jerome and Bonnie Mooney (the
"Mooneys") and Boyd and Manuela Brown (the "Browns") developed
6

three apartment buildings on two adjacent parcels of land.
119, 196.

R.

At the time of development, the Mooneys and the Browns

owned an aggragate one-half interest in the northernmost parcel
and the apartment building constructed thereon (hereinafter
referred to as the ''Elizabeth House" or "Foxtail's" property).
R. 120, 197.

The other one-half interest in the Elizabeth House

property was owned by Elizabeth Drinkhaus.

R. 120, 197.

Also at

the time of development, the Mooneys and the Browns owned an
aggragate two-thirds interest in the southernmost parcel and the
two apartment buildings constructed thereon (hereinafter referred
to as the "Victoria Canyon" or "Defendants'" property).
50, , 162, 197.

R. 149-

The other one-third interest in the Victoria

Canyon property was owned by J.M. and Brenda Touw (the "Touws").
R. 149-50, 162, 197.
During construction, a common connection to the water main,
pipes, and an underground vault and water meter (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the "utilities") were installed to
serve all three apartment buildings.

R. 120, 196-97.

The

utilities were installed primarily on the Elizabeth House side of
the property line.

R. 120, 197.

In 1995, the Mooneys, the Browns, and DrinkhaUs conveyed
their interest in the Elizabeth House property to City Creek
Square, L.C. ("CSS").

R. 120, 197.

Prior to this conveyance,

Jerome Mooney informed Tom Felt, the managing member of CSS, that
all three apartment buildings shared common water utilities, that
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the utilities were located on the Elizabeth House property, and
that the water costs for all three apartment buildings were
charged to the owners of the Victoria Canyon property.
197.

R. 121,

CSS eventually sold the Elizabeth House property in 2000.

R. 121, 198.
Plaintiff Foxtail Properties, LLC ("Foxtail") acquired the
Elizabeth House property in 2002.

R. 121, 198. As a condition

of obtaining financing for the purchase of the Elizabeth House
property, Foxtail was required to separate its water utilities
from those serving Defendants7 property.

R. 121-22, 198.

Accordingly, Foxtail installed new water pipes, a new meter, and
a new underground vault to serve only the Elizabeth House
property.

R. 122, 198. The old utilities remain and continue to

serve Defendants' property.

R. 122, 199.

Shortly after purchasing the Elizabeth House property,
Foxtail informed Defendants that the presence of their utilities
on Foxtail's property constituted a trespass and requested, in
writing, that they remove the utilities forthwith.

R. 150, 163.

When Defendants refused to comply, Foxtail filed the instant
lawsuit, praying only for injunctive relief and requesting that
the Court order the removal of the utilities from Foxtail's
property.

R. 122, 199.

Defendants moved for Summary Judgment, and Judge McCleve of
the Third District Court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed
Foxtail's Complaint, concluding that i) the installation of the
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utilities in the 1970's was not a trespass, (ii) the continued
presence of the utilities on Foxtail's property is not a
trespass, (iii) if the continued presence of the utilities on
Foxtail's property were a trespass, it is a "permanent" trespass
and Foxtail's claim is therefore barred by the three-year statute
of limitations for trespass, (iv) Defendants have an easement by
implication related to the utilities which is an absolute defense
to Foxtail's claim of trespass,

R. 195-203 (a copy of Judge

McCleve's Order, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law is
attached hereto as Addendum A ) .

Judge McCleve did not address

Foxtail's additional argument that Defendants' continued use of
the utilities, causing water to continually flow through
Foxtail's property, is an actionable, continuing trespass.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the
District Court misapplied the law of trespass to conclude that
the continuing presence of Defendants' utilities upon Foxtail's
property does not constitute a trespass.

u

The gist of an action

of trespass is infringement on the right of possession."

John

Price A s s o c , Inc. v. Utah State Conf., Bricklayers Locals Nos.
1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1980) .

Because the presence

of Defendant's utilities upon Foxtail's property precludes
Foxtail's use of that property for something else, it is clearly
an uinfringement on the right of possession" and therefore
constitutes a trespass.
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The District Court also erroneously concluded that Foxtail's
action for trespass, even if otherwise cognizable, is barred by
the statute of limitations.

The District Court concluded that

the statute of limitations applicable to Foxtail's claim "expired
sometime in the 1970s."

R.

However, because Foxtail's claim

for trespass did not arise until it purchased the Elizabeth House
property in 2002, the claim cannot now be barred by the threeyear statute of limitations.

The District Court's conclusion

leads to the absurd result that the statute of limitations
expired even before it began.

Furthermore, even if Foxtail's

claim could have arisen prior to its purchase of the property in
2002, it could not have arisen earlier than May of 2000, when
Defendants lost the permission they previously enjoyed to
maintain their utilities on Foxtail's property.

Moreover,

because Defendants continue to use the utilities, the trespass is
continuing and therefore, not barred by the statute of
limitations.

The District Court failed to even address this

argument.
Finally, the District Court erred in concluding that
Defendants are entitled to an easement by implication because
Defendants failed to satisfy two essential elements of such an
easement.

First, an easement by implication requires that the

two adjacent parcels of land enjoyed "unity of title" at the time
the use for which the easement is claimed was first imposed upon
the servient estate.

See Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152
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(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

However, the undisputed facts before the

District Court showed that the two adjacent parcels of land at
issue in this case did not, at any relevant time, enjoy such
unity of title.

Therefore, the District Court's conclusion that

"there was unity of title sufficient to support an easement by
implication" was erroneous.
The District Court also erred in concluding that Defendants
had satisfied the "necessity" element of an easement by
implication.

This element requires the party claiming the

easement to prove that "the easement was reasonably necessary to
the enjoyment of the dominant estate."

Id., 774 P.2d at 1152.

However, Defendants acknowledged to the District Court that there
may be alternative ways to provide culinary water to their
property, R. 129, and Defendants failed to offer any relevant
evidence in support of their assertion that removal of the
utilities would be prohibitively expensive.

A mere assertion

without evidence to support it is "wholly insufficient to support
a summary judgment motion."
P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998).

Connor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 972
Therefore, the District Court erred

in concluding that Defendants had satisfied the "necessity"
element.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
FOXTAIL DOES NOT HAVE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR TRESPASS.
The first step in evaluating Foxtail's claim for trespass is
to define the cause of action with reasonable specificity,
11

including all essential elements of the cause of action.
Trespass has been defined variously by Utah Courts as "a
possessory action . . . [t]he gist [of which] is infringement on
the right of possession," John Price A s s o c , Inc. v. Utah State
Conf., Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214
(Utah 1980), and n a wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of
another."
1983).

Holm v. B & M Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah

Applying these broad definitions to the facts of this

case, it is clear that the continued presence of Defendants'
utilities on Foxtail's land constitutes a trespass.

The

utilities consist of pipes, a water meter, and an underground
vault, all of which occupy space below the surfaces of Foxtail's
land, as well as an unsightly manhole cover which occupies space
in the middle of Foxtail's lawn.

R. 120, 196-97, 211 (p. 21).

As long as the utilities are occupying that space, Foxtail cannot
use that land for any other purpose (e.g., planting a tree).
Without a doubt, the presence of Defendant's utilities on
Foxtail's property infringes on Foxtail's possession of that
property and, therefore, constitutes a trespass.
While the definitions above are helpful in identifying the
general nature of the tort of trespass, however, they do not
spell out its elements with specificity.

In Walker Drug Co.,

Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (Walker
II), the Utah Supreme Court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 158 in its attempt to define trespass.
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That

Section provides:
One is subject to liability to another for trespass,
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any
legally protected interest of the other, if he
intentionally
(a)
causes a
(b)
(c)
is under
Restatement

enters land in the possession of the other, or
thing or a third person to do so, or
remains on the land, or
fails to remove from the land a thing which he
a duty to remove.
(Second) of Torts § 158

(1965).

Under the Restatement definition, it is clear that the
continued presence and use of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's
property constitutes a trespass.

First, Defendants' failure to

remove their utilities from Foxtail's property after being asked
to do so clearly falls under subsection
definition.

(c) of the Restatement

Moreover, by continuing to use the utilities located

on Foxtail's property, Defendants are continuing to cause water
to enter Foxtail's property in violation of subsection (a) of the
Restatement definition.

Therefore, Foxtail has stated a

cognizable claim for trespass under both Utah case law and the
Restatement definition.
Defendants relied exclusively on Holm, 661 P.2d 951, in
urging the District Court to define trespass simply as a
"wrongful entry upon the lands of another."
at 9 5 2 ) .

R. 122 (citing Holm

Defendants argued that the continued presence and use

of the utilities cannot constitute a trespass because the
original installation of the utilities was a cooperative effort
among all the owners at the time of development, and, therefore,
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there was no "wrongful entry" upon Foxtail's property.

R. 123.

However, Defendants focus on the word "entry" is misguided.

In

Comment (b) to Section 158 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
it is stated that:
[T]he phrase "enters land," is for convenience used
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to include,
not only coming upon land, but also remaining on it,
and, in addition, to include the presence upon the land
of a third person or thing which the actor has caused
to be or to remain there.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 cmt. (b) (1965).

Similarly,

the court in Holm used the phrase "wrongful entry" for
convenience and did not intend to narrow the common law
definition set forth in the Restatement.

Therefore, this Court

should not rely on the phrase "wrongful entry" as urged by
Defendants.

Rather, this Court should look to th€* common law

definition of "trespass" set forth in the Restatement and quoted
above.
Nonetheless, even if this Court does adopt Defendants'
definition of "trespass," it leads to the same conclusion that
Foxtail has stated a cognizable claim.

By continuing to use the

utilities located on Foxtail's property, Defendants are causing
water to flow through Foxtail's property without right or
permission.

Such use clearly constitutes a "wrongful entry" of

water onto Foxtail's property.
In concluding that Foxtail does not have a cognizable claim
for trespass, the District Court adopted the Defendants' proposed
definition, stating simply: "Trespass is defined as a
14

x

wrongful

entry upon the lands of another. "'

R. 199.

The District Court

went on to conclude, without additional explanation: "The
continued presence of the Utilities on Plaintiff's property is
either not a trespass, or is, in the alternative, a 'permanent'
trespass."

R. 200.

In reaching this conclusion, the District

Court made no reference to either John Price, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214
(trespass is "a possessory action . . . [t]he gist [of which] is
infringement on the right of possession),
definition of trespass.

or to the Restatement

The District Court's failure to properly

define the tort of trespass lead it to erroneously conclude that
the presence of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's property was
not a trespass.
Moreover, the District Court utterly failed to address
Foxtail's additional argument that Defendants' continued use of
the utilities, causing water to flow through Foxtail's property,
constitutes a trespass.

If the tort of trespass is to be defined

simply as a "wrongful entry," it is vital to evaluate Foxtail's
claim that the use of the utilities, as opposed to the mere
presence of the utilities, constitutes a trespass.

In the

hearing before the District Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Foxtail's counsel stressed the importance of
this distinction as follows:
Now, it's important in analyzing Foxtail's claim here
to keep in mind that there are really two bases for the
claim of trespass. . .
On the one hand, you have the pre--the actual,
physical presence of the water mater on Foxtail's
15

property. And on the other hand, you have the
defendants' continued use of that water meter and those
pipes . . .
[R. 211 p. 12]

I think that the use of the water system,
continued use of the water system is absolutely clearly
a trespass. [R. 211 p. 18]

Let me just identify a couple of key things that I'd
like the Court to remember when you go back and when
you read the memos. . . The first is that Foxtail has
two bases for their claim of trespass; one is the pipes
and one is the water. [R. 211 p. 29]
Despite this reminder, the District Court failed to address this
argument and entered no conclusions of law with respect to
Defendants' continued use of the utilities.

As explained above,

water flowing through Foxtail's property without right or
permission is a "wrongful entry" of water onto Foxtail's property
and also meets the definition of trespass found in subsection (a)
of the Restatement.

See supra p. 12-13.

Accordingly, the

District Court erred granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment without considering Foxtail's argument that Defendants'
ongoing use of the utilities constitutes a trespass.
In short, the District Court erred in concluding that the
presence of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's property is not a
trespass and erred further in failing to address Foxtail's
argument that Defendant's continued use of the utilities is a
trespass.

Under both the John Price definition and the

Restatement definition, the presence of the utilities on
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Foxtail's property is a trespass.

Under both the Holm definition

and the Restatement definition, the Defendant's continued use of
the utilities is a trespass.

Accordingly, the District Court's

conclusion that Foxtail has not stated a cognizable claim for
trespass must be reversed.
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
FOXTAIL'S CLAIM FOR TRESPASS IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.
The District Court erred in concluding that Foxtail's claim
for trespass is barred by the three-year statute of limitations
found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1).

In reaching this

conclusion, the District Court characterized the presence of the
utilities on Foxtail's land as a "permanent" trespass, for which
the statute of limitations period commenced at the time the
utilities were installed in the 1970s.

R. 200.

Therefore, the

District Court concluded, "an action for such trespass is now
barred by the three year statute of limitations, which expired
sometime in the 1970s.

R. 200.

The District Court erred on

several fronts: (i) Foxtail's cause of action could not have
accrued until it purchased the property in 2002 and, thus, the
statute of limitations does not expire until 2005; (ii) even if
Foxtail's cause of action accrued before it purchased the
property, it could not have accrued before May of 2000 when
Defendant's finally lost the permission they previously enjoyed
to use and maintain the utilities in their present location;
(iii) the presence of the utilities on Foxtail's property is an
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encroachment and should therefore be characterized as
xv

continuing," not ^permanent"; and (iv) Defendants' continued use

of the utilities is itself a trespass that should be
characterized as ''continuing, " with each new use giving rise to a
new cause of action.

The District Court's conclusion leads to

the absurd result that the statute of limitations period expired
even before it began and this conclusion must therefore be
reversed,
A.
FOXTAIL'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TRESPASS ACCRUED FOR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURPOSES AT THE TIME IT
PURCHASED THE PROPERTY IN 2002.
w

[Al cause of action accrues 'upon the happening of the last

event necessary to complete the cause of action.'"

Hill v.

Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Utah 2001) (quoting Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).

In other words, u[a]

cause of action arises the moment an action may be maintained to
enforce a legal right."
1977).

Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Utah

As Defendants recognize, n an action sounding in trespass

cannot be maintained by one who did not have actual or
constructive possession of the land at the time the alleged acts
of trespass were committed."
P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984)).

R. 122 (citing Wood v. Myrup, 681
In the present case, Foxtail did

not have actual or constructive possession of the Elizabeth House
property until it purchased that property in 2002.

R. 199-200.

Because Foxtail could not have maintained a trespass action
against Defendants until that time, Foxtail's cause of action did
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not accrue for statute of limitations purposes until then.

See

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 210 (1987) ("a right of action
concerning real property does not accrue, so as to affect the
running of the statute of limitations, until the substantive
right of plaintiff arises.")

Consequently, Foxtail's claim

cannot now be barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
B.
FOXTAIL'S CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT HAVE ACCRUED
UNTIL MAY OF 2000 WHEN DEFENDANTS' LOST PERMISSION TO
USE THE UTILITITES IN THEIR PRESENT LOCATION.
Even if Foxtail's cause of action accrued before Foxtail
purchased the Elizabeth House property, the claim could not have
accrued earlier than May of 2000.

Neither Foxtail nor Foxtail's

predecessor in interest could have maintained a cause of action
for trespass against Defendants as long as Defendants had
permission to use and maintain their utilities on the property
now belonging to Foxtail.

In other words, as long as Defendants

had such permission, their actions were not "wrongful" - an
essential element of the tort of trespass.

See Siegel v. Salt

Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist., 655 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah
1982) (verbal grant of easement defeats claim of trespass because
no "wrongful entry."); Ash, 572 P.2d at 1380 (the statute of
limitations period does not begin to run n in an action for
possession of land until the right of possession has been so
challenged as to give rise to a cause of action.");

see also

Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colorado Central Credit Union, 793
P.2d 470, 475 (Wyo. 1990) (xx[c]onsent of the possessor or another
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authorized to consent is an absolute defense to trespass."); 54
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 210 (1987) ("A statute of
limitations on actions for the recovery of real property or for
the possession thereof is put in operation when plaintiff
discovers defendant trespassing on the land and notifies him to
cease.").

Because the Defendants had permission to install and

use the utilities at the time the properties were developed, no
cause of action for trespass accrued at that time.

As explained

below, it would not be until May of 2000 that Defendants finally
lost the permission they previously enjoyed to use and maintain
their utilities on the Elizabeth House property.
As Defendants noted,

vx

the Browns and the Mooneys held an

interest in both properties at the time of development, in the
1970's, and continued to hold such an interest until 1995."
128.

R.

Presumably, therefore, Defendants had permission to use the

utilities until at least 1995, when they sold the Elizabeth House
property to City Creek Square, L.L.C. ("CCS").

R. 120, 197.

Therefore, no cause of action against Defendants for trespass
accrued earlier than 1995.
Upon its purchase of the Elizabeth House property in 1995,
CCS also granted Defendants permission to use and maintain the
utilities at their present location.

Prior to CCS's purchase of

the Elizabeth House property, Jerome Mooney told Tom Felt,
managing member of CCS, that the utilities located at the
Elizabeth House served both the Elizabeth House and Defendants'
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property.

R. 121, 197.

Additionally, Mr. Mooney explained that

the water bill for both properties would come to Defendants and
that CCS would not be required to pay any portion of that bill.
R. 144.

Accordingly, as Defendants now acknowledge, "CCS

acquiesced to this situation, and the presence of the water
system . . . was therefore not a source of any complaint."
128.

R.

CCS's acquiescence was tantamount to tacit consent to

Defendants' continued use of the utilities.

Indeed, CCS

benefited immensly by granting that consent - CCS was never
legally obligated to pay for any of the water used by the
Elizabeth House.
R. 121, 198.

CCS sold the Elizabeth House in the year 2000.

Consequently, Defendants had permission to use and

maintain their utilities on the Elizabeth House property until
2000.
Because Defendants had such permission until the year 2000,
a cause of action for trespass did not accrue until that time, at
the earliest.

Foxtail initiated this action in October of 2002,

well within the three-year limitation period for trespass.

R. 1.

Therefore, even if Foxtail's cause of action accrued before it
purchased the Elizabeth House property, the claim is not timebarred.
C.
BOTH THE PRESENCE AND USE OF DEFENDANTS[ UTILITIES
ON FOXTAIL'S PROPERTY ARE CONTINUING TRESPASSES, WITH
EACH NEW USE OF THE UTILITIES GIVING RISE TO A NEW CAUSE
OF ACTION.
In determining when a cause of action for trespass accrues
for statute-of-limitations purposes, it is first necessary to
21

characterize the trespass as either permanent or continuing.

See

Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d
1133, 1135-36 (Utah 2002); Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil
Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1995) (Walker I ) . A "permanent"
trespass (i.e., one that "will presumably continue indefinitely")
accrues from the time the trespass is committed.
1135 (quoting Walker I at 1232).

Breiggar at

A "continuing" trespass, in

contrast, is characterized by either (i) a possibility that the
trespass may be "discontinued at any time," or (ii) multiple acts
of trespass giving rise to multiple causes of action.
(quoting Walker I at 1232).

Id.

A continuing trespass may be

challenged at any time and will never be barred by the statute of
limitations prior to abatement.

Id.

In characterizing a

trespass as permanent or continuing, courts look at the act
constituting the trespass, not to the harm resulting from the
act.

Id.
In the present case, Foxtail contends that there are two

distinct bases for trespass liability: (i) Defendants' failure to
remove the utilities from Foxtail's property after being asked to
do so, and (ii) Defendants' continued use of the utilities
without right or permission, causing water to continually flow
through Foxtail's property.

However, in concluding that any

trespass occurring in this case is a permanent trespass, the
District Court ignored both bases for liability put forth by
Foxtail and erroneously identified the act of trespass as the
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installation of the utilities at the time of development (this,
despite Foxtail's concession below that the act of installing the
utilities could not be a basis for liability, as that act was
done with the knowledge and cooperation of all parties involved).
R. 150.

This is the specific error that lead the District Court

to conclude that that the statute of limitations expired in the
1970s - even before Foxtail purchased its property.

R. 200.

i.
The District Court Erred in Characterizing
the Presence
of Defendants' Utilities on Foxtail's
Property as a Permanent Trespass.
As the Court in Breiggar directs, we must first identify the
act constituting the trespass in determining if the trespass is
permanent or continuing.

Id.

Here, the act constituting the

trespass is less an overt act than inaction in the face of a
duty.

As explained above, Defendants' failure to remove its

utilities from Foxtail's property after being asked to do so
gives rise to liability for trespass under subsection (c) of the
Restatement definition.

See supra p. 12-13.

To reiterate, that

section provides:
One is subject to liability to another for trespass,
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any
legally protected interest of the other, if he
intentionally

(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he
is under a duty to remove.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965).

Similarly, the act

of trespass (i.e., failing to remove the utilities from Foxtail's

23

property) is also the basis for liability under John Price, 615
P.2d 1210, 1214 (trespass is u a possessory action . . . [t]he
gist [of which] is infringement on the right of possession).
Having identified the act of trespass as Defendants' failure
to remove their utilities from Foxtail's property, it becomes
clear that this "act" should be characterized as a continuing
trespass.

A "continuing" trespass is characterized by either (i)

a possibility that the trespass may be "discontinued at any
time," or (ii) multiple acts of trespass giving rise to multiple
causes of action.

Breiggar at 1135 (quoting Walker I at 1232) .

First, it is certainly possible that Defendants would change
their collective mind and decide to remove the utilities as
Foxtail has requested.
discontinued.

In this event, the trespass would be

Because there is a possibility that the trespass

may be "discontinued at any time," the trespass should be
characterized as continuing under option (i) above.
Second, once you recognize that an omission in the face of a
duty can constitute an act of trespass, you must also recognize
that the omission recurs constantly so long as the actor fails to
act.

In other words, where the act of trespass is an omission, a

new cause of action accrues every moment that the defendant fails
to perform the required duty.

In the present case, the act of

trespass is Defendants' failure to remove their utilities from
Foxtail's property.

Every moment that Defendants fail to perform

this duty gives rise to a new cause of action.
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Because there are

multiple acts of trespass giving rise to multiple causes of
action, Defendants' failure to remove their utilities from
Foxtail's property is a continuing trespass under option (ii)
above as well.
In Hoery v. U.S., 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), the
Colorado Supreme Court aptly explains this concept as follows:
The typical trespass or nuisance is complete when it is
committed; the cause of action accrues, and the statute
of limitations begins to run at that time. But in
cases, for example, when the defendant erects a
structure or places something on or underneath the
plaintiff's land, the defendant's invasion continues if
he fails to stop the invasion and to remove the harmful
condition. In such a case, there is a continuing tort
so long as the offending object remains and continues
to cause the plaintiff harm. See W. Page Keeton et
al., Prosser and Keeton( on The Law of Torts § 13 (5th
ed. 1984).
In the context of trespass, an actor's failure to
remove a thing tortuously placed on another's land is
considered a "continuing trespass" for the entire time
during which the thing is wrongfully on the land.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161 cmt. b. Until the
thing tortuously placed on the land, or underneath the
land, is removed, then liability for trespass remains.
See Am. Jur.2d Trespass § 26 (2002) .

For continuing intrusions - either by way of
trespass or nuisance - each repetition or continuance
amounts to another wrong, giving rise to a new cause of
action. . . . The practical significance of the
continuing tort concept is that for statute of
limitation purposes, the claim does not begin to accrue
until the tortuous conduct has ceased.
Id. at 218. x

1

The Utah Supreme Court apparently recognized this principle in
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In characterizing the presence of Defendants7 utilities on
Foxtail's property as a permanent trespass, the District Court
relied solely on Breiggar.

In that case, the Court held that the

act of dumping debris onto the Plaintiff's property was the act
of trespass triggering the running of the statute of limitations
and that the fact that the pile of debris continued to remain on
the Plaintiff's property was irrelevant.
1136.

Breiggar, 52 P.3d at

The Court went on to characterize the act of dumping

debris as a permanent trespass and held that the plaintiff's
claim was time-barred because he filed his complaint more than
three years later.

Id. at 1136-37.

In the present case, the District Court erroneously
analogized the facts of this case to those of Breiggar,
identifying the act of trespass as the installation of the
utilities at the time of development, rather than Defendants'
failure to remove the utilities after being asked to do so.
Although some of Breiggar's language is helpful in determining
when Foxtail's cause of action accrued for statut€*-of-limitations
purposes, it is not helpful to analogize the facts of Breiggar to
the facts of this case.

The plaintiff in Breiggar did not argue

Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 348 (Utah 1996) where it
stated, "A cause of action based upon encroachment is of the
nature of either a continuing trespass or a nuisance."
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that the act of trespass was the defendants' failure to remove
the debris after being asked to do so.

Rather, it appears that

all parties in Breiggar agreed that the act of trespass was the
act of dumping debris.

Consequently, Breiggar is silent as to

whether the failure to remove the debris could have been a basis
for trespass liability and as to whether that omission would have
been characterized as permanent or continuing.

Because Breiggar

does not answer these questions, its holding in inapposite to the
case at bar.
ii. The District Court Erred in Failing to
Characterize Defendants' Ongoing Use of the
Utilities as a Continuing Trespass.
Defendants' ongoing use of the utilities causing water to
flow through Foxtail's property is another distinct basis for
trespass liability that must be evaluated separately for statuteof-limitations purposes.

Here, the act of trespass is

Defendants' ongoing use of the utilities.

A new act of trespass

occurs every time Defendants use their water.

Because Defendants

may discontinue their use of the utilities at any time and
because there are multiple acts of trespass giving rise to
multiple causes of action, it is clear that the District Court
erred in failing to characterize these acts as a continuing
trespass.

See Breiggar, 52 P.3d at 1135.

POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION.
The District Court correctly states the elements of an
easement by implication as follows:
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(1) that unity of title was followed by severance; (2)
that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible
at the time of severance; (3) that the easement was
reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant
estate; and (4) that the use of the easement was
continuous rather than sporadic.
R. 201 (citing Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

The existence of all these elements must "clearly appear

in order to sustain an easement by implication.7'

^d. at 1153,

n.l (quoting Orr v. Kirk, 224 P.2d 71, 73, 100 Cal. App.2d 678
(1950) ) .

In the instant case, the District Court erroneously

concluded that Defendants satisfied their burden of proving the
existence of all four necessary elements.

However, the

undisputed facts before the District Court established that the
two adjacent parcels of land at issue in this case did not, at
any relevant time, enjoy unity of title (element 1 ) . Moreover,
the District Court erroneously concluded that the claimed
easement is reasonably necessary (element 3 ) , despite Defendants'
failure to present any relevant evidence to support this
conclusion.2

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District

Court's conclusion that Defendants are entitled to an easement by
implication.
A.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT "THERE
WAS UNITY OF TITLE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN EASEMENT BY
IMPLICATION."
Although the District Court recognized that the two adjacent
parcels at issue (Victoria Canyon and Elizabeth House) were not

2

Foxtail concedes that element 2 (apparent and visible) and
element 4 (continuous use) have been satisfied. See R. 158*
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entirely under common ownership at the time the utilities were
installed, it nonetheless concluded that this partial "unity of
title [was] sufficient to support an easement by implication."
R. 201.

At the time of development, the Browns, the Mooneys, and

the Touws each owned a one-third interest in the Victoria Canyon
properties.

R. 149-50, 162, 197.

Also at that time, the Browns

and the Mooneys each owned a one-quarter interest in the
Elizabeth House property while the remaining one-half interest
was owned by Elizabeth Drinkaus.

R. 120, 197.

The Defendants

argued before the District Court that, despite the different
ownership of the two properties, "there was still a basic
commonality of ownership between the two parcels because the
Browns and the Mooneys held an interest in both properties."
128.

R.

However, the Defendants fail to consider the relevant case

law and, as a result, their conclusion and the conclusion of the
District Court is simply wrong.
Although Foxtail's counsel was unable to find any Utah cases
on point, the question of what constitutes "unity of title" for
purposes of an implied easement has been answered clearly by
courts from other jurisdictions.

In Farley v. Howard, 70 N.Y.S.

51, aff'd 65 NE 1116 (App. Div. 1901), the court explained the
century old rule that strict unity of title is required before an
easement by implication can arise:
The reason of the rule [requiring unity of title] is
that a person who has absolute right to do just as he
pleases with both lots has seen fit to impose upon one
of them a burden for the benefit of the other. If both
29

are his, he can do as he likes with them; and if, for
the sake of convenience, or of enhancing the value of
one, he chooses to give to it an apparent and visible
easement over the other, that is his business; and when
he sells the dominant lot the purchaser has the right
to assume that he buys everything that is apparent and
visible, and therefore the easement. But that rule
necessarily involves the proposition that the man
creating the easement is the absolute owner of both
lots, and has, therefore r the right to put upon either
any incumbrance he likes. Quite clearly the rule fails
in this case. Howard was the absolute owner of 32
only. As to 34 he owned but a one-half interest.
While he could do what he pleased with his undivided
one-half interest in that lot, he could not impose upon
Dumond's one-half interest any burden whatever.

Id. at 53.

The same is true in the instant case.

Because the

Browns and the Mooneys did not own all of the interest in the
Elizabeth House property at the time the water system was
installed, they could not burden Drinkhaus's one-half interest
for the benefit of the Victoria Canyon properties..

In other

words, because there was not unity of title at the time the
utilities were installed, no easement by implication could arise.
In the more recent case of U.S. v. Thompson, 272 F.Supp. 774
(E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969), the court
reached the same conclusion.

In that case, the purported "common

owner" of the three parcels at issue owned one parcel himself and
partnership interests in the other two parcels.

The court

disagreed with the plaintiff's assertion that this ownership
scheme "amounted to" a unity of title, stating:
[Ujnity of title or ownership simply did not exist nor
did there exist anything which "amounted to" such
unity. The Court does not think that any such unity
can be found in the mere fact that Mr. Thompson serves
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as connecting links between the Summit House and his
own property to the north and between the Summit House
and the Shopping Center property to the south. He owns
the fee of the property to the north; he owns
partnership interests in the Summit House property and
the Shopping Center property but the two partnerships
are entirely different. There has never been any unity
of possession or use of the three parcels of land.
Id. at 785.

In the instant case, Defendants claim that there was

a "basic commonality of ownership" between the Victoria Canyon
and the Elizabeth House properties.

R. 128.

However, just as

the ownership scheme in Thompson did not ''amount to" unity of
title, neither does the "basic commonality of ownership" in the
case before this Court.
B.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
DEFENDANTS SATISFIED THE "NECESSITY" ELEMENT OF AN
EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION WHEN DEFENDANTS FAILED TO
PRESENT ANY RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS
CONCLUSION.
Although Defendants recognize that "there may be alternative
ways to connect the Victoria Canyon buildings to the water main,"
R. 129 , the District Court erroneously concluded that "the
removal of the Utilities . . . would entail a significant
reconnection expense to Defendants," and therefore, that the
claimed easement was reasonably necessary to the dominant estate.
R. 201-202.

However, Defendants failed to present any relevant

evidence to support its assertion that the alternatives to the
status quo would be prohibitively expensive.

The only evidence

cited by the District Court in support of its conclusion is the
fact that Foxtail spent approximately $16,990 to separate its
water supply from Defendants'.

R. 202.
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However, Defendants

presented no evidence to suggest that Defendants would incur a
similar expense to relocate its utilities onto its own property.
In fact, the District Court record is devoid of any evidence
whatsoever as to how much this might cost Defendants.
Similarly, Defendants failed to present any evidence of the
surrounding circumstances that might have helped the District
Court determine the "reasonableness" of the necessity required to
establish an easement by implication.

The "necessity" element of

an easement by implication is a "reasonable
requirement.

Butler at 1154,

necessity"

An inquiry into the

"reasonableness" of the necessity requires a thorough
consideration of the totality of the circumstances.

As Foxtail's

counsel explained to the District Court in the hearing on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment:
And in terms of necessity, it's a reasonable
necessity standard. It's not a strict necessity
standard, it's a reasonable necessity. In order to
ascertain what is reasonable and what would be a
reasonable expense to put the defendants to to fix this
problem, you got to look at a lot of other factors that
we don't have before us also. For example, you've got
to look at the value of the building and the rental
income from the building that they're talking about.
If this is, say, a three or four million dollar
building, is an expense of $20,000 unreasonable?
Just to give you a comparison, if -- if the
defendants had to re-roof that building, how much would
it cost? Well, we don't know, but it's probably going
to cost more than $20,000, probably more than the cost
of putting a new water meter in, although we don't
know, because we don't have that evidence before us.
R. 211 p. 25.

If Defendants had to re-roof their building at an

expense of $20,000, would this expense be prohibitively expensive
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so as to prevent Defendants from making the necessary repair?
The amount of money Defendants have available to relocate their
utilities would also be relevant in determining whether the
expense of doing so would be unreasonable.

However, Defendants

failed to present any evidence to the District Court suggesting
that they do not have sufficient funds available to relocate
their utilities.
Defendants bald assertion that the costs of relocating their
utilities would be prohibitively expensive is without any factual
basis in the record and therefore cannot support a grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

See Connor v. Union

Pac. R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998) («[Defendant] fails
to support this argument with an affidavit or any other evidence.
Its argument is nothing more than a mere assertion, which is
wholly insufficient to support a summary judgment motion.").
Therefore, this Court should reverse the District Court's grant
of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only where there
exists no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56.

While the parties in the instant case do not disagree about the
basic facts of the case, they disagree wildly about the legal
conclusions to be drawn from those facts.

As explained in the

foregoing pages, Foxtail has set forth a cognizable claim for
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trespass on the basis of Defendants' failure to remove its
utilities from Foxtail's property and their continued use of
those utilities causing water to continually flow through
Foxtail's property.

This claim is not barred by the statute of

limitations for a variety of reasons, the most notable being that
Foxtail could not have maintained an action for trespass against
the Defendants until it purchased the Elizabeth House property in
2002.

Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run

until that time and this action was commenced later that the same
year.

Moreover, the purpose of the statute of limitation would

not be furthered by affirming the District Court's conclusion
that Foxtail's claim is time barred.

"Statutes of limitations

are intended to prevent unfair dilatory litigation."

Vigos v.

Mountainland Builders, Inc., 993 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 2000).
Foxtail certainly has not been dilatory in its pursuit of this
claim - Foxtail filed its complaint less than one year after
purchasing its property.

Finally, the District Court's

conclusion that Defendants ai€> entitled to an easement by
implication must be reversed.

The undisputed facts show that the

two adjacent parcels at issue could not satisfy the "unity of
title" element.

Additionally, Defendants failed to present any

relevant evidence supporting their assertion that the easement is
reasonably necessary for the use of their property.

For all the

foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be
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reversed.
SUBMITTED this February 24, 2004.

Davicf S. w Kottl<gr
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0429
Telephoae: (801) 531-7870
Facsimile: (801) 531-7968

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FOXTAIL PROPERTIES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS*
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

REECE GOODRICH, TRUSTEE; SHIRLEY ANN
GOODRICH, TRUSTEE; REECE GOODRICH;
SHIRLEY ANN GOODRICH; BOYD J. BROWN;
JEROME f-L MOONEY; BONNIE S. MOONEY;
ANDR£MA,INC,

Defendants.

1 Case No. 020911345
| Judge Sheik K, McCleve

The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to a Motion for Summary
Judgment (the "Motion") filed by Defendants Reece Goodrich, Shirley Ann Goodrich, Boyd J.
Brown; and REMA, Inc. (hereinafter, 'Defendants**) on or about June 10,2003.
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants requested that the Court find aod
conclude that: (1) the existence of underground utilities (hereinafter, the "Utilities") on Plaintiff
Foxtail Properties, LLC's property, which serve Defendants* adjacent property, do not constitute

a trespass; and (2) that Defendants are entitled to an implied easement relating to said Utilities.
The Court, having studied the memoranda and other materials submitted by both Plaintiff and
Defendant, having considered oral arguments of counsel, and being thus fully advised in the
premises, hereby enters the following Stipulated and Undisputed Facts, Conclusions of Law, and
Order:
STIPULATED AND UNDISPUTED FACTS
L

In the early 1970s, Defendants Jerome £L and Bonnie S. Mooney (the "Mooneys"),
together with Boyd J. Brown and his wife (the "Browns") developed three apartment
buildings on two adjacent parcels of real property on North Canyon Road in Salt Lake
City.

2.

On the northernmost parcel* the Mooneys and Browns built an apartment building known
as "Elizabeth House." This parcel will be referred to hereafter as either the Elizabeth
House property** or the "Plaintiff* s property."

3.

On the adjacent parcel to the south, the Mooneys and Browns built two apartment
buildings known as "Victoria Canyon North" and "Victoria Canyon South/* This parcel
will hereafter be referred to as either the "Victoria Canyon property" or "Defendants'
property/*

4.

When the Elizabeth House and Victoria Canyon properties were developed, a common
connection to the water main, pipes, and an underground vault and water meter

2

(sometimes referred to hereafter as the "Utilities**) were installed to serve both properties.
5.

The Utilities were installed primarily on the Elizabeth House side of the property line.

6.

The Utilities have been in place and has been used continuously since the early 1970s.

7.

The Utilities which pass through Foxtail's property provide culinary water to the Victoria
Canyon apartment buildings.

8.

At the time of development, the MooneysT as joint tenants7 and the Browns, as joint
tenants, owned an aggregate 2/3 interest in the Victoria Canyons properties, and the
remaining 1/3 was owned by JLM and Brenda K. Touw.

9.

Also at the time of development, the Mooneys^ as joint tenants* held title to an undivided
one quarter interest in the Elizabeth House property, and the Browns held the same type
of interest; the other undivided one half interest in the Elizabeth House property was held
by Elizabeth Buell Drinkhaus ("Brinkhaus").

10*

In 1995, the Mooneys, the Browns, dmi Drinkhaus conveyed their interest in the Elizabeth
House property to City Creek Square, L C ("CSS").

11.

Prior to the conveyance, Jerome Mooney informed Tom Felt, the managing member of
CSS, that the Victoria Canyon property and the Elizabeth House Property shared
common Utilities and meter; that the Utilities were on the Elizabeth House property; and
that water costs for both properties were always charged to the owners of the Victoria
Canyon property.
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12.

Tom Felt determined, prior to CSS's purchase, that CSS would have no liability for the
Victoria Canyon property water bill, even though the bill reflected the Elizabeth House
property's water use.

13.

CSS therefore bought the Elizabeth House property knowing that the Utilities were
primarily on the Elizabeth House side of the property line, and of the Browns' and
Mooneys" use of the Utilities on its property.

14.

The Browns, as joint tenants, still retain a partial interest in the Victoria Canyons
property.

15.

The Mooneys sold their interest in the Victoria Canyons properties prior to Foxtaifs
acquisition of the Elizabeth House property.

16.

CSS eventually sold the Elizabeth House property to Chrysalis, a limited partnership, in
the year 2000.

17.

Foxtail, Plaintiff heiein, subsequently acquired the Elizabeth House property from third
parties in approximately September of 2002.

18.

As a condition of obtaining financing for the purchase of the Elizabeth House property,,
Foxtail was required to sever the Elizabeth House property's connection to the shared
Utilities, and to install a separate meter*

19.

After expending approximately $16,990.00 on the installation of a separate water supply
and meter for the Elizabeth House property, David Kottler, of Foxtail, requested that the

4
ffi #5fe'l^#'

owners of the Victoria Canyons property pay two thirds of the cost.
20.

Upon Defendants' refusal to share in the costs, Foxtail filed the instant lawsuit, claiming
that the Utilities serving the Victoria Canyon property are a trespass.

21.

Foxtail has prayed only for injunctive relief, requesting that the Court order the removal
of the Utilities from Foxtail's property.

22.

Foxtail has claimed no damages relating to the alleged trespass.

23.

Defendants* use of the Utilities on Foxtail's property has been continuous since the
1970s, long before severance of the Browns' and the Mooneys* common ownership of the
Victoria Canyon and Elizabeth House properties in 1995.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court concludes that:
L

The installation of the Utilities in the 1970s was not a trespass. Trespass is defined as a
"wrongful entry upon the lands of another." See Woodv, Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255,1257
(Utah 1984). When the pipes, meter, and vault were installed^ both the Elizabeth House
and Victoria Canyon properties properties were being developed by the Browns and the
Mooneys, as common owners, with the cooperation of other owners. The installation of
the shared Utilities was thus a cooperative effort by both joint owners and others who had
an interest in the two properties, The installation could not constitute a "wrongful entry
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upon the lands of another" because it was by consent of all the interested landowners.
2.

Because Foxtail did not have actual or constructive possession of the land at the time the
installation occurred, it cannot maintain a cause of action based upon the installation. An
action sounding in trespass cannot be maintained by erne who did not have actual or
constructive possession of the land at the time the alleged acts of trespass were
committed. See Holm v. B.&M. Servs^ 661 R2d 951,952 (Utah 1983).

3.

The continued presence of the Utilties on Plaintiffs property is either not a trespass, or is,
in the alternative, a "permanent" trespass. Under Utah law, a trespass is either permanent
or continuing. See Breiggar Properties, LC. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133
(Utah 2002), "Where a nuisance or trespass is of such character that it will presumably
continue indefinitely* it is considered permanent, and the limitations period runs from the
time the nuisance or trespass is created." See Breiggar, 52 P.3d at 1135. From the time
it was installed, in the 1970s, as a permanent fixture of the land, the Utilities were of such
a character that their existence would "presumably continue indefinitely." Therefore,
even if the Utilities could somehow constitute a trespass, an action for such trespass is
now barred by the three year statute of limitations, which expired sometime in the 1970s.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1).

4.

Defendants have demonstrated the elements of an easement by implication related to the
Utilities. Defendants* showing of their entitlement to an implied easement on Foxtail's

6

property is an absolute defense to Foxtail's claim of trespass. Under Utah IawT the
elements necessary to establish an easement by implication aie: (1) unity of title followed
by severance; (2) apparent, obvious, or visible servitude at the time of severance; (3) the
easement f s reasonable necessary to the dominant estate; and (4) the use of the easement
was continuous. See Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150,1152 (Utah C t App. 1989).
Unity of title is evident because both Foxtail's property and Defendants* property were
originally owned in common by, and developed byr the Browns and the Mooneys. The
Browns and the Mooneys shared an interest in the Elizabeth House with Elizabeth Buell
Drinkhaus ("Drinkhaus"), and in the Victoria Canyon Apaitments with JJML and Brenda
K. Touw. Because the Mooneys and the Browns owned undivided interests in both
parcels up to the time of severance, there was unity of title sufficient to support an
easement by implication.
The servitude was obvious when unity of title was severed, in 1995, and the Elizabeth
House property was sold to CSS. Prior to CSS*s purchase of Elizabeth House from the
Browns* the Mooneys, and Drinkhaus, Jerome Mooney explained to CSS's principal^
Tom Felt, that the water connection to the City main, the meter, and the pipes were all on
the Elizabeth House side of the property line.
The easement under dispute is reasonably necessary for the dominant estate, as required
by the third element of m easement by implication. The Utilities on Foxtail's property
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provide culinary water to the Victoria Canyon apartment buildings. Without a connection
to the water main, the Victoria Canyon apartments would be uninhabitable. Moreover,
the removal of the Utilities from Plaintiffs property, even if feasible, would not come at
"little or no cost" to Defendant Plaintiff expended approximately $16,990.00 to install
new utilities on its property. It is thus apparent to the Court that the removal of the
Utilities, as prayed for in the Complaint, would entail a significant reconnection expense
to Defendants.
The use of the Utilities was continuous. Victoria Canyon North and Elizabeth House
were developed together in the early 1970s. At that time, the Utilities were installed. The
same system was in place and used continuously until Foxtail disconnected it as a source
of water for Elizabeth House, in 2002, and provided for a separate meter and water
connection to Elizabeth HouseIn summary, Foxtail has failed to state a cause of action for trespass because Foxtail did
not own the property at the time the Utilities were installed, and because the nature of the
trespass, if any, is permanent and now barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover,,
Defendants have demonstrated that the elements of an implied easement on the Foxtail
property are fulfilled.

8

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, all causes of action contained in Plaintiff's Complaint are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

D a W s . Kottler \
' * v-^~Attorney for Foxtail Properties, LLC

